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As a banker viewing the public policy issues that confront the financial services
industry today, I am heartened by the vigorous debate that is taking place in this
journal and others like it. The ability and likelihood of policy-makers deciding upon
the wisest directions can only be enhanced when alternatives are explored in depth
and the faults and weaknesses of each position are thereby exposed. The need for
such debate to illuminate prudent and sagacious choices has never been more urgent.
The United States banking system is undergoing the most fundamental and far-
reaching change since the Depression. Yet our lawmakers in Washington have so far
failed to come to grips with the situation and change is thus occurring without the
benefit of a well-defined federal blueprint.
It is important to recognize that economic forces in banking and commerce do
not respect the boundaries of man-made laws and will cause change regardless of
what laws are in effect. The history of banking in the United States is replete with
examples of new products and services being introduced without legislative sanction
or even regulatory approval, with the result being that the law was defined by the
marketplace rather than the process that any civics book would describe. In our
modem era, certificates of deposit (CDs) were developed in 1961 by Citibank as a
way of circumventing long standing federal interest rate limitations on short-term
deposits in order to compete with the Treasury bill for larger corporate deposits. In
order to provide retail customers with a brokerage account that could be accessed by
both checks and a credit card, my organization, Banc One Corporation, helped
Merrill Lynch in 1976 to introduce the Cash Management Account and thus initiate
the first of many inroads against Glass-Steagall' restrictions. Interest rate restrictions
on consumer accounts could not withstand the dual attack in the late 1970s of
inflation and deposit substitutes offered by thrifts and money market funds, and were
finally removed after they had ceased to have any useful economic purpose. I believe
it was also such economic forces that led to the removal of long-established
geographic restrictions on bank expansion and entry. In Ohio, for example, the
failure in 1985 of the Home State Savings Bank and other privately insured thrift
institutions necessitated the infusion of out-of-state capital provided by a New York
banking institution to enable several thrifts to satisfy their depositors' claims, and
thus resulted in the Ohio legislature passing a regional interstate banking law to insure
equitable treatment to those Ohio banks that wished to expand beyond our state
borders. Indeed, it may seem that in many cases, lawmakers will approve important
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legislative changes only after economic forces have succeeded in circumventing
existing outdated statutes. Often it is the fear of the results that any change will bring
that causes this legislative paralysis.
The economic forces that are currently at work in the world of banking are
significant and have already resulted in a massive upheaval of the old order.
Resembling a process in which only the fittest survive, this upheaval has been
referred to by one observer as Darwinian banking. 2 Consider for a moment that in
ranking the ten United States banking organizations with the largest market
capitalization, only four currently on the list were there in 1980. While thirty years
ago, seven of the world's largest banks were based in the United States, today only
one ranks in the top twenty-five. Also, a recent article on banking in a respected
journal began "American commercial banks have a choice: They can change or they
can die. ' 3 It is ironic to observe that in the midst of such a competitive upheaval,
many of our legislators continue to view banks as quasi-public utilities whose social
welfare obligations are of primary importance. It is in the context of the change that
the United States banking system is already undergoing that public policy needs to be
formulated, and must be premised on the realities of the world, not merely our wishes
about how we would like the world to operate. Furthermore, the reality we must
ultimately confront in all our thinking is not how well banks in one state can compete
with those in other states, but how well the American banking system can compete
with those of other countries such as Japan and West Germany.
A few years ago, many Ohio bankers and legislators would have viewed the
approach of October 17, 1988 with fear and apprehension. An invasion of large
unfriendly predators would have been seen as imminent. After October 17, 1988,
Ohio law no longer restricts the ownership of Ohio banks to bank holding companies
located either in Ohio or a region of bi-contiguous states and instead permits such
ownership on a nationwide basis. The old conventional wisdom was that ownership
restrictions were needed to insure local ownership because only locally owned banks
could be knowledgeable about the needs and circumstances of smaller businesses and
individuals. It was thought that once ownership restrictions were removed, there
would be an immediate feeding frenzy of large money-center banking organizations
from New York, Illinois, Texas, and California rushing into Ohio to buy all of our
local banks and moving the decision-making power out of Ohio to cities geograph-
ically and philosophically distant. I do not feel particularly bold in predicting that
such a revolutionary and unsettling scenario is unlikely to occur. In part it is based
on the observation that only one large bank in Ohio so far has been acquired by an
out-of-state institution in the approximately two years that Ohio's current interstate
banking law has been in effect. This is not to say, however, that evolutionary changes
will not occur in the next few years in which ownership of an Ohio bank may be
transferred to one in New York, Illinois, Texas, or California, but indeed it is just as
likely that one or more Ohio-based banking organizations will be the acquirers of
2. See A Survey ofInternational Banking, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1988, at 5.
3. Andrews, The Remaking of America's Banks, INsTIrTnONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1988, at 98.
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banks in those four states, just as they have been in the states bi-contiguous to Ohio
that now form our interstate banking region.
My reason for making this prediction is not to argue that bank acquisitions by
out-of-state organizations are either good or bad. Rather, it is to make the point that
as a general rule the modernization of archaic banking laws will not lead to the
nightmares that many have predicted, but rather will result in acceptable change that
will enable banks to survive and prosper in a financial world that is becoming
increasingly more competitive and global. As in other areas, the conventional
wisdom on why a particular banking law should not be changed is often wrong. Yet,
while the pace, scope, and complexity of banking have increased dramatically in
recent years, legislative recognition of these developments has been slow in coming.
Change is thus occurring in the context of a legal and statutory framework that is
outdated and inadequate to meet the challenges currently before us.
In this maelstrom of change, the United States Congress to date has not played
a very visionary role. The reasons why Congress has acted so cautiously include
factors such as concerns about the safety and soundness of the banking system, the
desire not to offend any group or industry that opposes changes to the status quo,
particularly the well-financed lobbying efforts of the securities and insurance
industries, and finally a lingering populist distrust of banks that dates back to
Revolutionary War times. Recently, there have been indications that Congress may
be prepared to act to modernize our federal banking laws. In enacting the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987, 4 Congress appeared to recognize that it was time to
act and time to initiate "a comprehensive review of our banking and financial laws
and to make decisions on the need for financial restructuring legislation in light of
today's changing financial environment both domestic and international. . .. -5 One
hopes this statement signals a genuine intention to act rather than the initiation of a
study as a way of avoiding difficult decisions.
Recognizing that immediate attention cannot be given to the entire spectrum of
financial industry issues, there are three areas that I believe Congress has a particular
role to play in helping make this banking evolution occur in a sensible fashion. The
first issue needing resolution is the fiscal crisis surrounding the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation. The second is a review and rationalization of the present
crazy-quilt pattern of interstate banking legislation, and the third is the removal of the
statutory barriers that prohibit banks from offering various securities, real estate, and
insurance products to their customers.
The first area of concern to banking and the financial system generally that the
upcoming Congress needs to address is the precarious financial condition of the
governmental entity responsible for insuring deposits of the thrift industry, the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Although it has been an
article of govermental policy for several decades to view the banking and thrift
4. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM.m. NEws 566-72.
5. Id. § 203(a), at 584.
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industries as separate and distinct, any resolution of the FSLIC crisis is likely to
significantly affect the banking industry for the following reasons. First, despite
official policy, banks and thrifts directly compete with each other in several areas,
primarily in the consumer deposit and loan markets, and such competition will be
impacted by the outcome of this legislative process. Second, the enormity of the
FSLIC financial crisis will preempt Congress' attention to any matter involving
banking and finance, and thus a successful and speedy resolution of the FSLIC
problem is needed for Congress to begin focusing on the modernization of the
banking system. Third, also due to the enormity of rescue effort that FSLIC will
require, efforts will be made to make the banking industry subsidize a portion of that
rescue.
The FSLIC crisis has arisen because of the billions of dollars that the thrift
industry has been losing during the past several years. The result has been a dramatic
increase in the number of insolvent savings and loan associations. This situation is
exacerbated by regulatory and legislative paralysis that enables both insolvent and
marginally capitalized thrifts to continue functioning and thus losing more money for
which FSLIC is ultimately accountable. It is sobering to note that according to a
General Accounting Office study published in 1987, almost fifteen percent of the
nation's operating thrifts had a negative net worth and these savings and loans would,
if liquidated, by themselves exhaust all available reserves in FSLIC.6
I believe there are several premises upon which any legislative approach to a
FSLIC rescue must be based. As an initial starting point, the need for a separately
regulated housing finance industry must be carefully examined. I suspect the outcome
of such a review will be that the thrift industry as we know it today will be regarded
as largely duplicative of other sources of such liquidity. Secondly, Congress must
demand and support prompt action by federal regulators to close insolvent institutions
and to impose sound capital standards for thrifts that are comparable to those of
banks. Thrifts that are unable to meet such standards after a reasonable adjustment
period should be closed or merged into healthy institutions, both thrifts and banks
alike. Finally, a ready source of liquidity exists to begin paying off this huge deposit
insurance debt. Both banks and thrifts are obligated to maintain reserve balances at
the Federal Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve Banks do not pay interest on these
reserve balances, and instead turn over to the U.S. Treasury the net earnings that
result. If interest were paid on these reserve balances and allocated to FSLIC, it seems
likely that over an extended period of time, the substantial earnings generated could
be sufficient to restore the fund to financial stability. At such time, whenever it
occurs, the Reserve Banks should be required to pay the interest payments directly to
the financial institutions that are maintaining these required reserve balances.
Geographic barriers are the next area I would like to see Congress address. For
6. U.S. GENERAL Accouimio OFFiCE, TmuFr IDuSmy: THE TREASURY/FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANc BoARD PLAN
FOR FSLIC RECAPrrALiZAION (1987).
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many years both the McFadden Act7 and the Bank Holding Company Act8 prevented
banking organizations from operating full-service banking offices across state lines.
Pressure to modify these statutes began to build in the 1970s and early 1980s, but no
effective coalition was ever put together to persuade Congress to act. Fortunately,
state legislatures were not so paralyzed, and beginning with the geographically
remote states of Maine in 1975 and Alaska in 1982, barriers began to fall. Most
significantly, a series of states in New England and the Southeast enacted statutes in
the early 1980s that permitted entry by out-of-state bank holding companies located
in nearby states. These so-called regional interstate banking statutes became the
model for other states to adopt as a way of gradually permitting interstate bank
expansion to occur. Thus, by mid-1988, a total of forty-seven states and the District
of Columbia had passed legislation that permitted interstate banking on either a
regional or national basis. Twenty of these states permit such expansion nationally.
Of the twenty-nine states that have adopted regional restrictions in their interstate
legislation, twelve (including Ohio) have provisions that will permit nationwide entry
after a specified trigger date.
Now that a significant majority of states have adopted laws that permit some
measure of interstate banking, banking organizations that have expanded to take
advantage of these new opportunities have begun to encounter difficulties in recon-
ciling the inconsistencies and peculiarities of the different states. To cite but one
example, Ohio law currently provides for an interstate region of all fourteen bi-
contiguous states (including, of course, Indiana) and will soon provide for nationwide
entry on a reciprocal basis. Indiana law provides for a slightly more compact region
of twelve states (including Ohio) but further requires that any non-Indiana banking
organization in the region that owns an Indiana bank must maintain eighty percent of
its deposits in subsidiary banks located within the Indiana interstate region. The effect
of this is that an Ohio bank holding company, such as Banc One Corporation, while
legally entitled to own banks outside of those states in the Indiana region, is precluded
by the deposit size restrictions from entering one of those states if the bank(s) it acquires
would dilute its deposit base in the Indiana region to less than eighty percent. To further
complicate the situation, another state in both the Indiana and Ohio interstate regions,
Pennsylvania, requires that an out-of-state acquirer in its eight-state interstate region
must maintain seventy-five percent of its total deposits in bank subsidiaries located in
states that accord reciprocity to Pennsylvania. Of the eighteen states in the combined
interstate regions of Indiana and Pennsylvania, these interstate regions only share four
states in common. While it is mathematically possible for an Ohio-based holding
company to maintain sufficient deposits in the four states that Indiana and Pennsylvania
both include in their regions, the practicalities of such a complex arrangement make
it most difficult to administer.
My hope is that Congress will act to provide some uniformity and consistency
7. McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
8. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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to these conflicting state laws. While the Congress displayed little enthusiasm in an
earlier period to remove barriers to interstate expansion of banks, the most
controversial issues that caused the legislative paralysis have been dealt with by the
various state legislatures in enacting their statutes. As the trigger date for nationwide
entry approaches in a number of states, the resistance to any congressional action
ought to be much less. For example, as described previously in this Article, a
significant concern during the 1970s was that money center banks, if so authorized,
would gobble up regional and community banks across the country. However, during
the time that the various state laws have been in effect, a number of regional bank
holding companies have grown significantly larger, thus making them less likely to
be acquired by the money center banks. In addition, the ability of money center banks
to expand at all is likely to be constrained by the burden that Third World debt has
placed on their balance sheets and by the higher capital requirements that the federal
bank regulators have recently established and which are due to become effective in
1992. Thus, Congress should be able to proceed to rationalize and provide some
uniformity to the variety of interstate bank statutes without needing to confront the
divisive and emotion-laden issues that prevented action in the previous decade.
The most serious statutory impediment currently facing the banking industry are
those laws that restrict the ability of banks to offer a variety of financial products to
their customers. The most sweeping of such laws is the Glass-Steagall legislation that
was passed during the Depression to require the separation of commercial from
investment banking, and thus places a litany of securities products off-limits to
commercial banks. Other significant financial products that are restricted by other
laws from being offered by banks include insurance and real estate. I believe the
fundamental premise upon which Glass-Steagall reform must begin from the public
policy standpoint is that the continued maintenance of this barrier threatens the
long-term viability of American commercial banks. Ironically, commercial bank
viability is diminished by the decline in profitability of traditional banking products
due to increased competition from nonbanking firms in offering these products or
their substitutes. For example, Federal Reserve data shows that in 1985 bank
profitability was at its lowest level in fifteen years while the market share of
commercial banks in the commercial loan market declined from over forty-three
percent in 1974 to about twenty-seven percent in 1985,9 primarily due to corporate
customers who use investment banks to obtain credit through the commercial paper
market. What is thus occurring is that commercial banks are being challenged by
nonbanking organizations that are seeking to become modern financial mega-firms
that not only offer the same services as banks but much more.' 0
In addition, U.S. banks are increasingly losing business to foreign banks whose
9. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Recent Performance of the Commercial Banking Industry, Q. REv.,
Summer 1986, at 3.
10. It is noteworthy that in a 1987 poll of consumers conducted by the American Banker, Sears, Roebuck & Co.
was selected by more consumers as being best able to meet their financial service needs than any other f'mancial
organization. Rosenstein, Consumers Say Sears Best Meets Financial Service Needs, AmspicAN BAwNER, Sept. 28, 1987,
at 1, col. 2. Martin Mayer also wryly noted that a slogan for Sears Financial Services might be: "If you lose your shirt,
we'll sell you another." M. MAvEn, THE MoNEY BAzAs 34 (1984).
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countries do not separate commercial and investment banking. With greater compe-
tition taking place in overseas financial markets, borrowers can obtain more
economical terms. Thus, many foreign borrowers have abandoned U.S. banks for
their financing, and each year more U.S. companies are looking to European and
Japanese banks rather than their American counterparts for their borrowing needs.
Of critical importance in advancing the debate on this issue is the need for
recognition by all that the historical premise of the Glass-Steagall Act, that the stock
market crash of 1929 and the subsequent collapse of the banking system in 1933 were
due to bank securities activities, is misplaced and inaccurate. Ample evidence is now
present to refute this notion, but it is not yet clear whether the evidence has been
sufficiently absorbed and understood by those involved in making public policy.
What is clear, however, is that opponents of reform will continue to promote these
well-worn arguments that serve to protect the securities industry's cartel-like profits.
Thus, while there is no dispute that the October 1987 stock market crash occurred
without the participation of banks in the securities markets, the securities industry's
rejoinder has been that the crash would have been that much worse if banks had had
securities powers.
In proposing the removal of Glass-Steagall barriers, one needs to do so in a
responsible manner and thus needs to be cognizant of the regulatory apparatus that
would likely be needed to replace it. The objectives must be to insulate a bank from
undue risk, to warn investors of the nature of their risk, to prevent conflicts of
interest, and to meet safety and soundness concerns. This task is straightforward and
only becomes complex if extraneous factors such as industry protectionism are given
consideration. Bank deposits, which carry federal deposit insurance, should be
insulated from any risks associated with newly-authorized securities activities. As
banking organizations are empowered to offer new products, these services ought to
be conducted in a subsidiary that is distinct from the federally insured bank."1 While
there wuld be a need to insure a layer of legal insulation between the bank and the
securities affiliate, it is fortunate that such protection has already been enacted in
sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 which place limits on loans and
other transactions in which these affiliated entities can engage. Finally, the securities
affiliate of a banking organization ought to be subject to the same provisions of
federal securities laws that securities firms are, with oversight and enforcement
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In contrast to the selling of securities products, the arguments against permitting
banks to sell insurance or real estate have not been related to the safety and soundness
of these activities. Instead, these industries have argued that giving banks such
powers would tend to concentrate too much power in banks and could lead to bank
customers being pressured or forced to obtain their insurance or real estate servicing
needs from their banks. Regrettably, it has not proved sufficient to demonstrate that
11. Those securities activities, however, that banks already offer should not be required to be moved to a securities
affiliate.
12. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, §§ 23(a)-(b), 38 Stat. 251, 272-73 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
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federal law already precludes banks from engaging in such practices. Moreover,
insurance agency services in particular entail little risk and banks have safely engaged
in such services for many years. Further, allowing such activity is procompetitive.
Permitting banks to offer generalized insurance agency services would result in lower
insurance costs to the public and would enable banks to use their existing branching
and data processing systems to modernize the delivery of insurance products.
This Article began with a discussion of how market forces cannot be controlled
by artificial legislative constraints. Such forces are currently at work in chipping
away the restraints imposed on banks as they attempt to satisfy their customers' needs
for services in the areas of securities, insurance, and real estate. If this were an earlier
time in our nation's history when our economy could be insulated from foreign
competition, the preservation of legislative restraints could occur without significant
harm to the banking industry. As we approach the last decade of this century,
however, such a luxury does not exist. If Congress manages the process of granting
new banking powers in the same manner that it has dealt with some other
controversial issues such as geographic expansion, effectively providing no support
and allowing the problem to be resolved by others, the ability of American banks to
compete in a global economy will be seriously undermined.
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